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Abstract: 
Lenin received a severe shock in 1914 when the main parties of the socialist Second 
International supported the war effort of their respective governments.  But the shock 
did not lead to his rejection of the prewar Marxist orthodoxy but rather to an outraged 
affirmation of this orthodoxy against those who (in Lenin’s view) had betrayed it.  
Lenin’s rhetorical stance can therefore be described as ‘aggressive unoriginality’.  Lenin 
insisted that the key themes of ‘Left Zimmerwald’—the name given to the socialist 
current of which he was the principal spokesman from 1914 to 1916—were based 
squarely on the prewar consensus of ‘revolutionary Marxists’, particularly as expressed 
by Karl Kautsky.  Among these themes are the underlying idea of a revolutionary 
situation, the assumption that the war had created a revolutionary situation, and the 
claim that ‘socialist patriotism’ during the war represented the triumph of prewar 
opportunism.   
 
Résumé: 
Lénine a reçu un choc sévère en 1914 quand les principaux partis de la Deuxième 
Internationale socialiste ont soutenu l’effort de guerre de leurs gouvernements 
respectifs. Toutefois, le choc ne l’a pas amené à rejeter l’orthodoxie marxiste de 
l’avant-guerre mais plutôt à affirmer outrageusement cette orthodoxie contre ceux qui, 
de son point de vue, l’avaient trahie. La posture rhétorique de Lénine peut ainsi être 
décrite comme ‘banalement agressive.’ Lénine soutenait que les thèmes clés de la 
‘Gauche de Zimmerwald’ – le nom donné au courant socialiste dont il était le principal 
porte-parole entre 1914 et 1916 – étaient fondamentalement basés sur le consensus 
d’avant-guerre des ‘Marxistes révolutionnaires,’ comme pouvait l’exprimer en 
particulier Karl Kautsky. Parmi ces thèmes figurent l’idée sous-jacente d’une situation 
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révolutionnaire, l’hypothèse que cette situation révolutionnaire a été créée par la 
guerre, et l’argument selon lequel le ‘patriotisme socialiste’ d’alors correspondait au 
triomphe de l’opportunisme de l’avant-guerre. 
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• Lénine • Kautsky • Deuxième Internationale • La Gauche de Zimmerwald • 
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In the early summer of 1914, Lenin had very little idea of what the looming 
war would mean for him personally.  He even assumed his work load 
would be eased somewhat if war actually broke out, since his connections 
with the Russian underground would be thoroughly disrupted.  But when 
war finally came, it brought some devastating surprises.  Even after 
Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914, the Social Democratic 
parties in Germany, Austro-Hungary and France were still organizing mass 
protests against war. The main German Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
newspaper, Vorwärts, continued to thunder against the imperialist war and 
to threaten the capitalist warmongers with revolutionary action. But on 5 
August Lenin received a major shock: the SPD Reichstag delegation had 
voted unanimously for war credits. Forgotten was the traditional cry of 
‘not one penny — not one man’ for the capitalist state. When Lenin first 
saw the headlines in the village of Poronino (his summer residence outside 
Kraków), he was sure that it must be a provocation, a trick by the 
government to confuse the opposition. 
Lenin soon had his own firsthand experience with war hysteria. The 
local officials in Austrian Poland suspected the outlandish Russian 
emigrant of espionage. A police official reported that many meetings of 
Russian nationals had taken place at the residence of V. Ulyanov. There 
were rumors that Ulyanov had been seen taking photographs in the 
surrounding hills, but these proved unfounded. Nevertheless, the police 
official was of the opinion that Ulyanov should be under lock and key—
after all, his identity papers were in French, he received money from 
Petersburg, and he was in a very good position to give information about 
Austria to the Russians. 
Based on this irrefutable logic, Lenin was arrested and kept in the 
local jail from 8 August to 19 August. Thus the third decade of his political 
career began the same way as his first decade—in jail.  But the big 
difference between 1894 and 1914 was that Lenin now had powerful 
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friends on the outside. Among these was the leader of the Austrian Social 
Democrats, Victor Adler, who went to the Austrian Minister of the Interior 
to give personal assurance that no one was less likely to help the tsarist 
government than V. Ulyanov. When the minister asked, ‘are you sure he’s 
an enemy of the tsar?’ Adler answered, truly enough, ‘he is a more 
implacable enemy than your Excellency.’  
Orders soon came down to release Lenin, and even to allow him to 
travel to Switzerland. Right after getting out of jail, Lenin received another 
shock, in the form of a leaflet entitled ‘Declaration of Russian Socialists 
Joining the French Army as Volunteers.’ These Russian socialists outdid the 
Germans in their support of their government’s war effort—they joined the 
ranks of an allied army. Among the émigrés in France who showed their 
devotion to internationalism in this way were several Bolsheviks.  
Among many harrowing scenes, Lenin, his wife and his confused and soon-
to-die mother-in-law packed up and embarked on a week-long train trip to 
Bern, Switzerland (with a stop in Vienna to get necessary documents and 
to thank Victor Adler, soon to be a political enemy). When he arrived in 
Bern on 5 September, Lenin hit the ground running. The day he stepped off 
the train, he met with local Bolshevik émigrés and proposed a set of theses 
about the proper reaction to the war. Just a month had gone by since the 
outbreak of the war—a month mostly taken up with the hassles and 
uncertainties of jail and of picking up stakes—and yet Lenin was ready 
with theses that defined a radically new chapter of his career. 
Yet Lenin had to endure one more shock—in some ways, perhaps 
the most disorienting of all.  The betrayal of the SPD majority was an 
unpleasant surprise, but Lenin could instantly identify its cause: today’s 
‘social chauvinists’ (socialists who supported the war effort of their 
respective governments) were simply the incarnation of the age-old 
enemy: opportunism, ‘the bourgeois nature and the danger of which have 
long been indicated by the finest representatives of the revolutionary 
proletariat of all countries’ (Lenin 1960-68, 21:16).   Anyone reading these 
words from Lenin’s theses of September 1914 would have realized whom 
Lenin meant by ‘the finest representatives’: Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Kautsky. Luxemburg did in fact react to the war crisis as befitted an 
uncompromising foe of opportunism. But Kautsky? Lenin read with horror 
Kautsky’s many articles from autumn 1914 in which Kautsky seemed to tie 
himself in knots, not exactly in order to defend the new opportunism, but 
to excuse it, to cut it as much slack as possible, to avoid burning bridges 
within the party. Could it be that Kautsky, Karl Kautsky, was an 
opportunist and a philistine?  Lenin expressed his fury in letters: ‘I hate 
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and despise Kautsky now more than anyone, with his vile, dirty, self-
satisfied hypocrisy’ (Lenin 1960-68, 35:167).  
I have told the story of Lenin’s experience in the opening weeks of 
World War I in such detail in order to bring a home a fact that needs to be 
explained, namely, that Lenin took almost no time at all to arrive at the 
basic positions that would guide his political activity until the outbreak of 
revolution in Russia in early 1917.  The three most prominent themes in 
Lenin’s wartime program are already evident.  The first is the insistence on 
using the war crisis as an opportunity to foment socialist revolution in 
Europe.  The second is the interpretation of the wartime split in the 
socialist movement in terms of the prewar framework of ‘opportunism vs. 
orthodoxy’.  This interpretation found practical form in the demand for a 
new socialist international that would be opportunist-free.  Finally, Lenin 
becomes almost obsessive about a new form of opportunism that he calls 
kautskianstvo, named for its most emblematic representative, Karl Kautsky.  
I believe that behind Lenin’s unhesitating adaptation of his wartime 
platform is something I call his aggressive unoriginality.  Lenin did not have 
to arrive at new ideas: he could work perfectly well with the ideas he had, 
ideas that he shared with most other orthodox Marxists (or at least so he 
claimed).  ‘Aggressive unoriginality’ is a phrase that can be applied to 
Lenin’s outlook and rhetoric from 1914 to about the middle of 1919.  In 
this paper, I will restrict most of my comments to the pre-revolutionary 
period, 1914-1916, although I will also glance ahead at later developments.  
I mean three main things by the phrase ‘aggressive unoriginality’. 
 
Lenin is not polemicizing with orthodox Second International Marxism. 
If you pick up and read Lenin’s writings after 1914, you get the impression 
of a wholehearted rejection of the Second International and in particular of 
its main theoretical representative, Karl Kautsky.  One reason for this 
misleading impression is Lenin’s attacks on ‘Kautskyism,’ a term which 
most readers naturally understand to mean ‘the system of ideas set forth in 
the writings of Karl Kautsky.’  ‘Kautskyism’ is a somewhat misleading 
translation of kautskianstvo, which, as can be seen, is not an ‘-ism’ word.  
And indeed, a careful examination of what Lenin means by this word 
shows that it does not mean Kautsky’s prewar ideological outlook.  Very 
much to the contrary: Kautsky’s alleged repudiation of his prewar 
outlook—in deed, if not in words—is the archetypal manifestation of 
kautskianstvo.  For Lenin, Kautsky is a renegade.   
Socialist Studies: the Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 5(2) Fall 2009: 90-112 
94 
Thus, for Lenin, Kautsky’s behavior was emblematic of a general 
phenomenon which might be defined as ‘talking the revolutionary talk but 
refusing to walk the revolutionary walk’.  As such, many people who did 
not particularly agree with Kautsky on ideological issues were held by 
Lenin to be guilty of kautskianstvo—for example, Lev Trotsky and even 
non-Marxists such as Arthur Henderson. 
After 1914, even as he violently attacked kautskianstvo, Lenin never 
tired of recalling the days when ‘Kautsky was still a Marxist,’ that is, up to 
about 1909.  A detailed examination of these comments shows that they 
are almost all complimentary.  Lenin explicitly endorses Kautsky’s pre-
1909 writings on subjects as various as the coming era of war and 
revolution, opportunism, nationality policy, agricultural and peasant 
policy, and even dialectics.  He often cites ‘Kautsky-when-he-was-a-
Marxist’ as an authority in order to convince his audience — even when 
this audience is made up of militant Bolsheviks for whom Kautsky was a 
bitter political foe.  Lenin does not change his mind on this topic: the 
invocation of Kautsky as an authority is a constant feature of Lenin’s 
pronouncements from 1914 to 1920.1 
 
The ideas that underpinned Lenin’s political platform after 1914 came 
directly from Kautsky and other orthodox writers. 
In previous writings, I have emphasized the negative conclusion that Lenin 
is not engaged in ‘rethinking Marxism’ or repudiating his own earlier 
admiration for Kautsky’s writings.  But Lenin’s solidarity with Kautsky and 
other Marxist writers goes further.  The ideas most important to Lenin after 
1914 are also taken directly from Kautsky and others.  In other words, 
Kautsky’s prewar writings continue to be extremely influential for Lenin, 
and Lenin’s political outlook in the years after 1914 cannot be understood 
apart from this fact. 
The continuing influence of Second International orthodoxy should 
not be limited to Kautsky.  True, Kautsky’s role is vastly important and 
overshadows everybody else.  Nevertheless, Lenin insists that he is 
building on an widespread orthodox consensus.  Very often mentioned as an 
indicator of consensus is the Basel Manifesto of 1912 (as discussed below). 
                                                 
1
 See my remarks in the forthcoming symposium on Lenin’s What Is to Be Done? in Historical 
Materialism and Lih 2008.  I have compiled an extensive database of Lenin’s post-1914 
comments on Kautsky’s pre-1914 writings, which can be obtained from me at 
larslih@yahoo.ca.   
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Lenin himself aggressively emphasized his own unoriginality and he had 
good rhetorical reasons to do so.   
Lenin himself informed all and sundry that his current definition of the 
situation was based solidly on the prewar consensus and on Kautsky’s 
writings in particular.  In October 1914, he wrote his lieutenant Aleksandr 
Shliapnikov: ‘Obtain without fail and reread (or ask to have it translated for 
you) Road to Power by Kautsky [and see] what he writes there about the 
revolution of our time! And now, how he acts the toady and disavows all 
that!’ (Lenin, 1958-64, 49:24).  As we shall see, Lenin himself always 
remained loyal to Kautsky’s vision of ‘the revolution of our time’.   
Lenin insists upon his own ideological indebtedness in an 
aggressive fashion not only to bring out the heinousness of the renegacy of 
Kautsky and others, but also to show that he, Lenin, is not just some 
solitary nut but rather an orthodox Marxist whose platform rests on the 
consensus of the most learned socialist writers.  Of course, the fact that 
Lenin had rhetorical motivations for his stance of aggressive unoriginality 
is not a reason to doubt his sincerity and conviction.  Lenin was not lying 
when he affirmed his solidarity with Kautsky — or, if he was, more proof is 
needed than merely his desire to persuade his audience. 
Two comments before proceeding.  First, when I speak of Lenin’s 
‘unoriginality,’ I do not mean to say that he slavishly took all his ideas from 
elsewhere.  I make no assumption here about the actual source of Lenin’s 
outlook or any particular part of it.  What I do assert is that central aspects 
of Lenin’s outlook are shared with Kautsky and others, and that Lenin 
himself insisted on this. 
Second, today’s admirers of Lenin want him to be original and 
picture him as seeing through the unrevolutionary Marxism of the Second 
International.  Lenin’s own self-image is very different.  Lenin’s subjective 
perception is important in itself, but, as it happens, Lenin’s self-image is 
also an objectively accurate one.  People who would like Lenin to be a 
profound ‘rethinker’ of Marxism may perceive my argument as an attack 
on him.  This is not the case.  If Lenin’s ideas are good ones, they are good 
ones, regardless of whether or not he shared them with writers such as 
Kautsky.  And conversely, if they are bad ones, the endorsement by 
socialist authorities does not make them any better.  
As we have seen, in October 1914, Lenin advised his party comrade 
Shliapnikov to re-read Kautsky’s 1909 book Road to Power.  Lenin took his 
own advice, judging from an article published in December 1914 entitled 
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‘Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism’ (Lenin 1960-68, 21:94-101).   In 
this article he cited chapter and verse to demonstrate the excellence of 
Kautsky’s analysis.  I am going to cite the relevant passage in extenso, since 
it is (or, in any event, should be) central to any analysis of the historical 
context of Lenin’s wartime platform.  As scholarly ‘value added’, I have 
inserted page numbers to the specific passages quoted by Lenin (the 
references are to the English-language translation by Raymond Meyer).2 
For decades, German Social-Democracy was a model to the Social-Democrats 
of Russia, even somewhat more than to the Social-Democrats of the whole 
world. It is therefore clear that there can be no intelligent, i.e., critical, attitude 
towards the now reigning social-patriotism or ‘socialist’ chauvinism, without a 
most precise definition of one’s attitude towards German Social-Democracy, 
What was it in the past? What is it today? What will it be in the future? 
A reply to the first of these questions may be found in Der Weg zur Macht [The 
Road to Power], a small book written by K. Kautsky in 1909 and translated into 
many European languages. Containing a most complete exposition of the tasks 
of our times, it was most advantageous to the German Social-Democrats (in the 
sense of the promise they held out), and moreover came from the pen of the 
most eminent writer of the Second International. We shall recall the pamphlet 
in some detail; this will be the more useful now since those forgotten ideals are 
so often barefacedly cast aside. 
Social-Democracy is a ‘revolutionary party’ (as stated in the opening sentence 
of the pamphlet), not only in the sense that a steam engine is revolutionary, 
but ‘also in another sense’ *Road, 1].  It wants conquest of political power by 
the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Heaping ridicule on 
‘doubters of the revolution,’ Kautsky writes: ‘In any important movement and 
uprising we must, of course, reckon with the possibility of defeat. Prior to the 
struggle, only a fool can consider himself quite certain of victory.’ However, to 
refuse to consider the possibility of victory   would be ‘a direct betrayal of our 
cause’ *Road, 11]. A revolution in connection with a war, he says, is possible 
both during and after a war. It is impossible to determine at which particular 
moment the sharpening of class antagonisms will lead to revolution, but, the 
author continues, ‘I can quite definitely assert that a revolution that war brings 
in its wake, will break out either during or immediately after the war’ *Road, 
14+; nothing is more vulgar, we read further, than the theory of ‘the peaceful 
growing into socialism’ *Road, 21+.  ‘Nothing is more erroneous,’ he continues, 
‘than the opinion that a cognition of economic necessity means a weakening of 
                                                 
2
 Kautsky 1996 (this edition has been recently re-issued).  A contemporaneous English 
translation is available on the Marxists Internet Archive (www.marxists.org).   
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the will...  The will, as a desire for struggle,’ he says, ‘is determined, first, by the 
price of the struggle, secondly, by a sense of power, and thirdly, by actual 
power’ *Road, 26-7].   
When an attempt was made, incidentally by Vorwärts, to interpret Engels’s 
famous preface to The Class Struggles in France in the meaning of opportunism, 
Engels became indignant, and called shameful any assumption that he was a 
‘peaceful worshipper of legality at any price’ *Road, 33+.  ‘We have every reason 
to believe,’ Kautsky goes on to say, ‘that we are entering upon a period of 
struggle for state power.’ That struggle may last for decades; that is something 
we do not know, but ‘it will in all probability bring about, in the near future, a 
considerable strengthening of the proletariat, if not its dictatorship, in Western 
Europe’ *Road, 42]. The revolutionary elements are growing, Kautsky declares: 
out of ten million voters in Germany in 1895, there were six million proletarians 
and three and a half million people interested in private property; in 1907 the 
latter grew by 0.03 million, and the former by 1.6 million! [Road, 49+.  ‘The rate 
of the advance becomes very rapid as soon as a time of revolutionary ferment 
comes’ *Road, 51].  Class antagonisms are not blunted but, on the contrary, 
grow acute; prices rise, and imperialist rivalry and militarism are rampant 
[Road, 60-75].  
‘A new era of revolution’ is drawing near *Road, 76].  The monstrous growth of 
taxes would ‘long ago have led to war as the only alternative to revolution... 
had not that very alternative of revolution stood closer after a war than after a 
period of armed peace...’ *Road, 80+. ‘A world war is ominously imminent,’ 
Kautsky continues, ‘and war means also revolution’ *Road, 84].  In 1891 Engels 
had reason to fear a premature revolution in Germany; since then, however, 
‘the   situation has greatly changed.’ The proletariat ‘can no longer speak of a 
premature revolution’ (Kautsky’s italics) *Road, 84]. The petty bourgeoisie is 
downright unreliable and is ever more hostile to the proletariat, but in a time of 
crisis it is ‘capable of coming over to our side in masses’ *Road, p. 88]. The main 
thing is that Social-Democracy ‘should remain unshakable, consistent, and 
irreconcilable’ *Road, 89]. We have undoubtedly entered a revolutionary period 
[Road, 90]. 
This is how Kautsky wrote in times long, long past, fully five years ago. This is 
what German Social-Democracy was, or, more correctly, what it promised to 
be. This was the kind of Social-Democracy that could and had to be respected.   
The page numbers I have inserted bring out Lenin’s simple procedure: he 
sat down, went through the book page by page, and found something he 
liked on every few pages.  In fact, Lenin’s discussion, extensive as it is, 
underestimates the full overlap between Kautsky’s analysis and his own 
post-1914 outlook.  In the final chapters of Road to Power, Kautsky 
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sketches out a scenario of global revolution that he had been developing 
for a number of years—a scenario that Lenin accepted wholeheartedly and 
that became even more important to him as the years passed. 
An analysis of all the issues contained in this passage would entail a 
full examination of Lenin’s politics after 1914.  In this essay I will comment 
on four major aspects of Lenin’s aggressive unoriginality during this 
period. 
 
The General Idea of a Revolutionary Situation 
Both Kautsky and Lenin believed that there is such a thing as a 
‘revolutionary situation’, one that has very different political dynamics 
from a peaceful situation and therefore requires a very different set of 
tactics.  In Road to Power, Kautsky offered four conditions as necessary 
components of a revolutionary situation: a regime hostile to the people, a 
‘party of irreconcilable opposition, with organized masses,’ mass support 
given to the party, and, finally, an acute crisis of confidence within the anti-
popular regime (Kautsky 1996, 45).   Lenin later offered his own four-part 
definition of a revolutionary situation that, although it differs in details 
from Kautsky’s, is obviously derived from it. Lenin comments, after giving 
his definition, ‘such are the Marxist views on revolution, views that have 
been developed many, many times, have been accepted as indisputable by 
all Marxists, and, for us Russians, were corroborated in a particularly 
striking fashion by the experience of 1905.’3 
One aspect of a revolutionary situation, as seen by both Lenin and 
Kautsky, is the idea that the political education of the masses accelerates 
tremendously.  As Kautsky puts it in Road to Power: 
When times of revolutionary ferment come, the tempo of progress all at once 
becomes rapid.  It is quite incredible how swiftly the masses of the population 
learn in such times and achieve clarity about their class interests.  Not only 
their courage and their desire to fight, but also their political interest is spurred 
on in the most powerful way by the consciousness that the moment has arrived 
for them to rise by their efforts out of the darkest night into the bright glory of 
the sun.  Even the most sluggish become industrious; even the most cowardly, 
bold; even the most intellectually limited acquire a wider mental grasp.  In such 
                                                 
3
 Compare Lenin 1960-68, 21:214 with Kautsky 1996, 45, 51 (Lenin’s 1915 definition in 
Collapse of the Second International has three numbered parts, to which Lenin immediately 
adds a fourth, unnumbered condition).   
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times, political education of the masses takes place in years, that otherwise 
would require generations (Kautsky 1996, 51). 
Because of revolutionary situation is so distinct from a peacetime situation, 
it requires a fundamentally different set of tactics.  This proposition 
underlies the famous distinction made by Kautsky in his 1910 polemics 
with Rosa Luxemburg: a ‘strategy of attrition’ vs. a ‘strategy of overthrow.’  
Kautsky explained that the first tactic (the standard SPD activity of 
energetic socialist enlightenment and organization) was appropriate to a 
normal, non-revolutionary situation, whereas the second (mass political 
strikes and other non-parliamentary means of pressure) was appropriate 
to a genuinely revolutionary situation.  Kautsky added that, while at 
present Germany was still in a non-revolutionary situation, nevertheless a 
revolutionary crisis could be expected very soon (Grunenberg 1970). 
These points were taken up and emphasized in some very revealing 
polemics by Bolshevik writers in 1910-1911.  I shall discuss Kautsky’s 
concrete prediction of an imminent revolutionary crisis in the next section.  
Here I shall look at how Bolshevik writers endorsed Kautsky’s contrast 
between tactics appropriate to a revolutionary situation vs. those 
appropriate to a non-revolutionary situation. 
Both Kautsky and Luxemburg were supporters of the general 
Bolshevik strategy of relying on peasant rather than liberal allies in the 
upcoming democratic anti-tsarist revolution.  Menshevik writers were 
therefore glad to see the sharp dispute between Kautsky and Luxemburg 
and were quick to claim that Kautsky was finally moving away from his 
quasi-Bolshevism.  Iulii Martov made this argument in an article published 
in Kautsky’s own journal, Die Neue Zeit.  Martov regretted that during the 
revolutionary year 1905, after the tsar had granted basic political freedoms 
in October, ‘the idea of the possibility of a “strategy of attrition” entered 
nobody’s head.’  Instead, the workers embarked on the doomed uprising of 
December 1905 and met a bloody defeat.  But today (Martov continued), in 
1910, even hardened Bolsheviks like N. Lenin admitted that ‘up to now we 
“spoke French”, but now the time has come to “speak German”’ — that is, 
switch from the impatient revolutionary methods of the French to the 
patient, long-term methods of the Germans.   
Martov glossed Lenin’s metaphors: not ‘speak French,’ but speak 
‘Blanquist’ (that is, conspiratorial putschism).  Not ‘speak German,’ but 
speak ‘the universal [allgemeinmenschliche] method of Socialist work’ 
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(Martov 1910, 910-13).4  Thus Martov and other Menshevik writers 
maximized the clash between Kautsky and Luxemburg.  They pictured 
Kautsky as rejecting the Blanquist ‘strategy of overthrow’ in favor of the 
universally applicable ‘strategy of attrition.’  
Martov's reading of Kautsky was directly challenged in Die Neue Zeit 
by Julian Marchlewski, a Polish Social Democrat associated with the 
Bolsheviks.  Marchlewski pointed out that Kautsky himself used Russia in 
1905 as a situation in which the ‘tactic of overthrow’ was appropriate.  
Therefore, ‘Martov has messed up [verballhornt] Kautsky’s train of thought 
— he [Martov] wants the “strategy of attrition” to be applied always and 
under all circumstances.  This is opportunism pure and undefiled.  And it is 
truly a hair-raising misunderstanding for him to call on Kautsky for 
support’ (Marchlewski 1910, 101).  This particular ‘hair-raising 
misunderstanding’ of Kautsky is still widespread today. 
Marchlewski went back to Lenin’s actual comment (made in 
summer 1909) about ‘speaking French’ vs. ‘speaking German’ and showed 
that Martov had distorted Lenin’s point.  Martov incorrectly implied that 
Lenin was conceding that ‘speaking French’ had been a mistake.  Lenin’s 
actual point was that basic strategy had to correspond to the nature of the 
existing situation.  In Lenin’s words: 
During the revolution we learned to ‘speak French,’ that is, to introduce into 
the movement the greatest number of rousing slogans, to raise the energy of 
the direct struggle of the masses and extend its scope.  Now, in this time of 
stagnation, reaction and disintegration, we must learn to ‘speak German,’ that 
is, to work slowly (there is nothing for it, until things revive), systematically, 
steadily advancing step by step, winning inch by inch.5 
On the basis of this passage, Marchlewski draws a highly significant 
conclusion about Lenin, Kautsky, and the concept of a revolutionary 
situation: ‘As you can see, Lenin says here in concise words that tactics 
must be applied in an exact way to the situation; he recommends, if you 
will, the same thing as did Kautsky [a year later]: application of the 
“strategy of overthrow” and the “strategy of attrition” at the correct time’ 
(Marchlewski 1910, 102).6 
                                                 
4
 Although in quotes, Martov's words are a paraphrase of Lenin’s argument.  Martov also 
attacked Rosa Luxemburg for urging the SPD to ‘speak Russian,’ that is, to abandon its own 
correct tactic in favor of a tactic renounced in Russia itself even by extremists such as Lenin. 
5
 July 1909 (see Lenin 1960-68, 15:458; Lenin 1958-64, 19:50).  
6
 Lenin explicitly endorsed Marchlewski’s critique of Martov (NB: Marchlewski wrote under the 
name of J. Karski). 
LIH: Lenin’s Aggressive Unoriginality 
 
 
101 
The Looming Revolutionary Situation and the Role of War 
Starting at least as early as 1902, in his book Social Revolution, Kautsky had 
insisted that class antagonisms were sharpening — not softening, as 
argued by revisionists — and that a revolutionary crisis was brewing, both 
in Europe and on a global scale.  In his 1909 book Road to Power, he tied 
the onset of a revolutionary situation to the increasingly probable outbreak 
of war.  In his 1910 dispute with Luxemburg, he tied the onset of crisis 
even more tightly and explicitly to current political developments in 
Prussia.  
For Lenin, writing in 1910, Kautsky’s prediction of an imminent 
political crisis was a crucial and overlooked aspect of the Kautsky-
Luxemburg dispute.  Lenin pointed out that ‘Kautsky said clearly and 
directly that the transition [to a strategy of overthrow] is inevitable during 
the further development of the political crisis’ (Lenin 1958-64, 19:367).   
Lenin therefore minimized the significance of the clash between the 
German party’s two honorary Bolsheviks: they both believed that a 
fundamental turning point comparable to Bloody Sunday in January 1905 
was in the works.  The only disagreement was whether this turning-point 
would occur ‘now or not just yet, this minute or the next minute’ (Lenin 
1958-64, 20:18).  
In a 1912 article, Lev Kamenev—one of Lenin’s closest lieutenants 
at this time—also stressed Kautsky’s prediction of a looming revolutionary 
crisis.  In an effort to further minimize the significance of the clash, he 
added: 
It is possible, even while agreeing with Kautsky in his analysis of existing 
objective conditions, to see at the same time that the propaganda and agitation 
of his opponents on the left, and their critique of the insufficient initiative of 
the leading elements of the party—that these things not only reflect the 
growing mood of the masses, but also that they are a necessary element of the 
preparation of the masses for the coming ‘great battles’ (Kamenev 2003, 670). 
Accordingly, Kamenev divided the SPD left-wing into two tendencies: 
‘the advocates of a more active, mass-oriented tactic that reflects the mood 
of the lower classes [nizy]’ vs. ‘the careful leaders of the party, defending 
the old ways and not wanting to leave them until a switching over to new 
rails was dictated by the class enemy of the proletariat’.  When this article 
was reprinted in 1922, Kamenev appended the following comment to the 
passage just quoted: ‘Alas, they did not want to leave these old ways even 
when the class enemy issued a direct challenge to the proletariat.  We 
thought better of them than they deserved’ (Kamenev 2003, 671).   
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Thus, even in 1922, Kamenev does not say that Kautsky was wrong 
and Luxemburg was right in their 1910 debate.  Kautsky was right about 
the objective situation: the ‘strategy of overthrow’ was not applicable in 
1910.  Kautsky was also right about the impending revolutionary situation.  
But with hindsight, the Bolsheviks could see that Luxemburg was right 
about Kautsky — that is, her suspicion that Kautsky would never switch 
rails was well-founded. 
Looking back in 1917, Lenin used Kautsky’s idea of two strategies 
and used it to critique Kautsky’s own inability to switch from ‘speaking 
German’ to ‘speaking French.’  In this respect, Kautsky was a 
representative of a whole stratum of people addicted to routine and to 
conditions of legality: 
Speaking historically and economically, [these people] do not represent a 
special stratum, they represent only a transition from an outlived phase of the 
worker movement, from the phase of 1871-1914 — a phase that gave much 
that was valuable, especially in the art, so necessary for the proletariat, of slow, 
consistent, systematic, organized work in broad, very broad, fashion — to a 
phase that is new, one that became objectively necessary from the time of the 
imperialist war, opening an era of social revolution (Lenin 1958-64, 31:171-2).  
In Lenin’s view, the outbreak of war created a revolutionary situation 
almost by definition—and once again, Kautsky is a primary authority.  
Writing in early 1916, Lenin is outraged that Kautsky is now denying the 
need for revolutionary action, especially since ‘the one denying 
revolutionary action is the very same authority of the Second International 
who in 1909 wrote a whole book, Road to Power, translated into practically 
all the major European languages and demonstrating the link between the 
future war and revolution’ (Lenin 1958-64, 27:109-10). 
 In late 1918, in his masterpiece of aggressive unoriginality 
Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, Lenin claimed that the 
link between war and revolution was a commonplace among all prewar 
Marxists:  
Long before the war, all Marxists, all socialists were agreed that a European war 
would create a revolutionary situation… So, the expectation of a revolutionary 
situation in Europe was not an infatuation of the Bolsheviks, but the general 
opinion of all Marxists (Lenin 1960-68, 28:289, 292). 
Besides Kautsky’s writings, Lenin’s major piece of evidence for this 
assertion was the Basel Manifesto of 1912.  This manifesto was issued by 
an emergency conference convened by the Second International in Basel, 
Switzerland in November 1912, for the purpose of protesting against the 
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growing likelihood of war.  In an impressive show of unity, the conference 
unanimously passed a manifesto that committed the socialist parties to use 
the outbreak of war to advance revolution.  ‘Let the governments 
remember that, given the present condition of Europe and the mood of the 
working class, they cannot unleash a war without danger to themselves’ 
(Riddell 1984, 89). 
According to Lenin, the official socialist parties failed to act on the 
solemn commitment they had made at the Basel conference.  In so doing, 
they betrayed the whole history of the Second International, for the Basel 
Manifesto was nothing more than a summary of  
millions and millions of proclamations, newspaper articles, books, speeches of 
the socialists of all countries [from] the entire epoch of the Second 
International, 1889-1914…  To brush aside the Basel Manifesto means to brush 
aside the whole history of socialism.  The Basel Manifesto does not say 
anything special, anything extraordinary.  It provides only and exclusively that 
by means of which the socialists gained the following of the masses: the 
acknowledgement of ‘peaceful’ work as a preparation for the proletarian 
revolution (Lenin 1958-64, 27:102). 
In other words, Lenin and his fellow-thinkers represent continuity with the 
outlook of the Second International.  The leaders of the official socialist 
parties are the ones who are ‘brushing aside the whole history of 
socialism.’ 
 
The Continuity of ‘Opportunism’ 
‘Opportunism’ had always been the great enemy of what Lenin and others 
called ‘revolutionary Social Democracy.’  The opportunists were sincere 
and committed socialists, but unlike the orthodox Marxists, they believed 
more in class collaboration than class conflict as a way to achieve 
socialism.  The lesson Lenin drew from the support given to the war by the 
official parties was not the existence of a strong opportunist wing in the 
Second International.  He knew that already.  What surprised and shocked 
him was the revelation of just how powerful opportunism had become. 
His full explanation of the collapse of the Second International goes 
something like this: All during the history of the Second International, 
there has been a fight between revolutionary Social Democracy and 
opportunism.  All prominent Marxists had realized that opportunism was a 
strong and growing internal threat to the integrity of Social Democratic 
parties.  Kautsky in particular was one of the foremost fighters against 
opportunism, and his analysis remains useful today.  But very few realized 
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just how far the rot had gone until the crisis of 1914 revealed it.  The ‘social 
chauvinism’ and ‘social patriotism’ now current is merely the present-day 
expression of this age-old opportunism.  Opportunism was a malignant 
cancer that has destroyed the official parties of the Second International, 
but its triumph will not be long-lived.  The immediate task of those who 
remain loyal to revolutionary Social Democracy is to found a new, 
opportunism-free international.  
Thus Lenin.  Even when Lenin has condemned the old international 
root and branch, even when he insists on the necessity of creating a new 
international, he is explicitly operating with the traditional concept of 
opportunism.  As he remarked in 1915, ‘hardly a single Marxist of note can 
be found who has not acknowledged many times and on a variety of 
occasions that the opportunists are truly hostile to the socialist revolution, 
a non-proletarian element’ (Lenin 1958-64,  26:113).7  In the spirit of 
aggressive unoriginality, he is happy to give Kautsky his due credit in 
fighting opportunism in the past.  Even the project of splitting Social 
Democracy if opportunism becomes too powerful is buttressed by 
Kautsky’s  authority.8 
The political thinking behind this wager on anti-opportunism is 
expressed in the following passage from Kautsky’s Road to Power, one that 
Lenin directly cites in his article of December 1914 discussed earlier: 
The more the Social Democratic Party maintains itself as an imperturbable 
power in the midst of the perturbations of authority of every kind, all the 
higher will its authority rise.  And the more it persists in irreconcilable 
opposition to the corruption of the ruling classes, all the greater will be the 
trust placed in it by the great masses of the people in the midst of the general 
decay that today has laid hold even of the bourgeois democrats, who are 
completely abandoning their principles in order to win the government’s favor. 
                                                 
7
  Many of the ideas put forth by Lenin and his associates about the social roots of 
opportunism — for example, a ‘labour aristocracy’ bribed by gains from imperialism — were 
also widely bruited before the war.  For further documentation of Bolshevik aggressive 
unoriginality on the nature of imperialism, see Riddell 1984, 82-3 and 461-2. 
8
 ‘This same Kautsky wrote 15 years ago, at the beginning of the Bernstein affair, that if 
opportunism changed from a mood to a tendency, a split would be on the order of the day’ 
(from ‘Dead Chauvinism and Living Socialism’, Lenin 1958-64, 26:102).  Lenin also credits 
Kautsky with the idea of changing the party’s name from Social Democracy to Communist 
(Lenin 1958-64, 26:95 [December 1914]).  Other Lenin comments on Kautsky and opportunism 
are quoted below. 
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The more imperturbable, consistent, and irreconcilable the Social Democratic 
Party remains, all the more readily will it get the better of its opponents. 
To demand that the Social Democratic Party participate in a policy of coalition 
or alliance now, when the dictum about the ‘reactionary mass’ has become 
reality, is to expect the Party to commit political suicide.  To want the Social 
Democratic Party to link itself with bourgeois parties through an alliance policy 
now, at the very time when those parties have prostituted and utterly 
compromised themselves; to want the Party to link itself with them in order to 
further that very prostitution—is to demand that it commit moral suicide 
(Kautsky 1996, 89-90; the italicized words are those directly cited by Lenin). 
In this Kautsky passage from 1909, we see foreshadowed — no, not 
foreshadowed, but described in detail — Lenin’s political strategy in 1917.  
To compromise with ‘opportunism’, to cooperate with bourgeois parties, is 
to commit moral and political suicide.  To stand forth proudly as an 
uncompromising party of irreconcilable opposition to the existing system 
is the path to receiving mass support. 
 
Fighting Doctrinal Innovation 
Lenin indulged in his usual share of doctrinal polemics in the period 1914-
1916.   People often think of Lenin as breaking new ground in these 
polemics.  What Lenin himself says he is doing, however, is defending 
established doctrine against newfangled distortions.  I believe his self-
image as a defender of orthodoxy is an accurate one.  Three issues stand 
out among the polemics of this period.  I list them in the order of the 
appearance of the innovations, not the order in which Lenin responded to 
them in print. 
 
1912: Kautsky on the state 
The polemic against the Second International in Lenin’s State and 
Revolution (1917) fall under two categories: forgetting or overlooking vital 
Marxist points about the state and actively distorting Marxist theory.  The 
accusation of forgetting applies mainly to the actions of the official socialist 
parties after the outbreak of war and thus is a typical example of 
aggressive unoriginality. 
Lenin provides exactly one example of theoretical distortion, 
namely, an article Kautsky wrote in 1912 in a polemic with Anton 
Pannekoek (Kautsky 1912).   A full analysis of Lenin’s critique would be out 
of place in this essay.  A couple of points need to be made.  First, this post-
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1909 Kautsky article is much more crucial to Lenin’s critique than anything 
written by Kautsky before 1909 — so much is clear from the text of State 
and Revolution itself as well as from Lenin’s various mentions of his book 
elsewhere.9 
Further, and most importantly, Lenin is not critiquing Kautsky’s 
orthodoxy from the point of view of some new, more radical understanding 
of Marx.  On the contrary, he is affirming standard prewar Marxist 
orthodoxy and claiming (on dubious textual grounds) that Kautsky’s 1912 
article rejects this orthodoxy.  According to Lenin, Kautsky argues or 
implies in his 1912 article that officials (whether of party or state) will 
never be subject to genuine democratic control, that officials will always be 
‘bureaucrats, that is, privileged persons detached from the masses and 
standing above the masses,’ that existing bourgeois parliamentary 
institutions do not need to be democratically transformed, that a socialist 
revolution will achieve no more than ‘a government willing to meet the 
proletariat halfway,’ and that fully democratized proletarian class rule is 
not a necessary ‘foundation for the socialist reconstruction of society’ 
(Lenin 1960-68, 25:483-91).  If Kautsky did indeed believe any of these 
things, then we can say that he had indeed become an out-and-out 
opportunist who rejected what he himself had written many times earlier. 
Lenin’s picture of the long-term ‘dying away of the state’ is also in 
line with prewar orthodoxy.  ‘Under socialism, everybody will administer in 
turn, and will quickly become accustomed to the idea that no one 
administers’ (Lenin 1960-68, 25:488).  The idea behind Lenin’s well-
known epigram was almost a cliché among prewar Marxists and even 
among non-socialist democrats (Lih 2006).  Modern-day readers of State 
and Revolution, unfamiliar with the real outlook of the Second 
International on these matters, are likely to misinterpret the thrust of 
Lenin’s polemic.  For Lenin, Kautsky’s 1912 article was the smoking gun 
that proved that Kautsky had abandoned certain key tenets of his earlier 
‘revolutionary Social Democracy’ and now openly sided with the 
opportunists on this question. 
 
                                                 
9
 For documentation, see note 1. Lenin was scandalized by Kautsky’s article as soon as it 
appeared.  In a 1912 letter to Kamenev, Lenin called it ‘arch-opportunist’ and demanded a 
‘principled rebuff’ to Kautsky (Lenin 1958-64, 48:87).  In other words, Lenin’s dislike of this 
article was not caused by any re-evaluation of Kautsky after the 1914 ‘betrayal’. 
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1914-1915: Kautsky on ‘Ultra-Imperialism’ 
The historical context of Lenin’s polemics with Kautsky about imperialism 
is set forth very clearly in The Socialists and the War by William English 
Walling.  This encyclopedic book by an American socialist was published in 
May 1915 and represents an invaluable contemporaneous survey of 
disputes within the international socialist movement. 
Walling introduces Kautsky as follows: ‘While [Kautsky] represents 
the orthodox Marxian view, he does not pretend to leave the Marxian 
doctrine intact on war or on any other matter.  Indeed, he has done more 
than any other living writer to develop that standpoint, and this is why, no 
doubt, he is known as the world’s leading Marxian.’  Walling then points 
out that in his latest articles on imperialism, Kautsky is breaking new 
ground: ‘Kautsky here renounces the widely prevalent Socialist belief 
(often seen in the following documents) that capitalism necessarily means 
war, or that permanent peace must wait for Socialism.  He takes the 
contrary view’ (Walling 1915, 16-8). 
As a typical expression of the standard Marxist view, Walling gives 
excerpts from articles by a prominent American socialist, Morris Hillquit.  
In articles published in 1914-1915, Hillquit makes the following assertions: 
The Socialists [as opposed to bourgeois pacifists] realize that under existing 
conditions wars are inevitable.  The Socialists assert that wars are bound to 
become more frequent and violent as the capitalist system approaches its 
climax … The clash might have come somewhat earlier.  It might have been 
delayed somewhat.  But in the long run it was inevitable.  It is idle to place the 
blame for the monstrous crime on any particular nation or government, to seek 
the aggressor.  Capitalism has made this war, and all the nations are the 
victims.10 
Walling comments that ‘if we wish to know what the Socialist thought on 
war was becoming immediately before the present struggle, we must look 
to Kautsky and [Otto] Bauer.  If we wish to know what it actually was, we 
must look to Hillquit’ (Walling 1915, 21).   
Lenin remained loyal to socialist thought as ‘it actually was’ and 
resisted Kautsky’s innovative speculation about the possibility of ‘ultra-
imperialism’.  Kautsky now argued: 
From the purely economic standpoint, it is therefore not excluded that 
capitalism may yet experience a new phase, namely the transposition of the 
                                                 
10
 These excerpts from Hillquit are from articles published in 1914-1915 (Hillquit’s emphasis); 
they can be found in Walling 1915, 22-3.  
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policy of the cartels to the realm of foreign policy—in other words, a phase of 
ultra-imperialism, which naturally we would have to combat as energetically as 
we combated imperialism, but the danger of which would take a different 
form, not a world arms race and threat to world peace (Salvadori 1979, 189). 
Lenin’s hostility to Kautsky’s new ideas about ultra-imperialism 
meant that his 1916 book, Imperialism, became an exercise in defending 
Kautsky-then against Kautsky-now.  As he explained in a preface to this 
work written in 1920, ‘Special attention has been devoted in this pamphlet 
to a criticism of the international ideological trend of kautskianstvo… The 
views held by Kautsky and his like are a complete renunciation of the very 
same revolutionary principles of Marxism which he championed for 
decades, especially in his struggle against socialist opportunism (Bernstein, 
Millerand, Hyndman, Gompers, etc.)’ (Lenin 1960-68, 22:192).11 
 
1916: Right of National Self-Determination 
In 1916, Lenin was involved in two major disputes over the national 
question, particularly over the right of self-determination and of secession.  
In each case, he pictured himself as fending off attacks on the official 
recognition of the right of national self-determination by the Russian Social 
Democratic Party, as stated in its program of 1903.  In each dispute, he 
reaffirmed his solidarity with Kautsky’s prewar writings and used him as 
an authority to rebut his opponents. 
In 1903, at the Second Party Congress, the main opponents of Point 
Nine of the party’s ‘minimum program’ — the recognition of the right of 
national determination — were Polish socialists who rejected the idea of 
separation from Russia as reactionary bourgeois nationalism.  In 1913-
1914, the same dispute arose once again and Lenin waded in with a 
polemic aimed particularly at Rosa Luxemburg.  Lenin repeated his basic 
point that 
if we do not put forth and emphasize in our agitation the slogan of the right to 
separation, we play in the hands not only of the bourgeoisie of oppressing 
nations, but also of its feudalists and its absolutism.  Kautsky put forth this 
                                                 
11
 The Second International Marxist quoted most extensively and favorably in Lenin’s 
Imperialism is Rudolf Hilferding, the Austrian author of Finance Capital (Hilferding 1910).  In 
the wartime writings of Lev Kamenev and Nikolai Bukharin, Hilferding is also praised for his 
‘brilliantly’ prophetic analysis (Kamenev 1922). For Bukharin’s use of Hilferding to refute 
Kautsky’s theory of ‘ultra-imperialism,’ see Bukharin 1915, 86-8, 92-3. 
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conclusion against Rosa Luxemburg a long time ago, and it cannot be disputed 
(Lenin 1958, 25:275).12 
These words were written in 1914, before the beginning of the war 
and Lenin’s break with Kautsky.  In 1916, when preparing his 1914 article 
for republication, Lenin was aware that his invocation of Kautsky as an 
authority might lead to misunderstanding.  He therefore commented in a 
footnote: ‘We ask the reader not to forget that Kautsky up to 1909, up to 
his excellent book Road to Power, was a foe of opportunism, to whose 
defense he turned only in 1910-11, and completely decisively only in 1914-
16’ (Lenin 1958-64, 25:259). 
In 1916, a group of Polish socialists returned to the attack.  Their 
manifesto, drafted by Karl Radek, emphasized their discontinuity with the 
prewar Second International: ‘The self-determination formula was left to 
us as an inheritance from the Second International… The policy of defense 
of the fatherland has brought results in the World War that very clearly 
show the counterrevolutionary nature of the self-determination formula’ 
(Riddell 1984, 350-1). 
In response, Lenin emphasized continuity with prewar polemics.  He 
argued that the critics of Clause Nine in 1916 were making exactly the 
same mistake made by the critics back in 1903.  In each case, the 
‘theoretical kernel’ of the debate was that a dismissive attitude to the right 
of national self-determination was a form of ‘economism,’ a Russian form 
of opportunism that downgraded the urgency of democratic revolution 
(Lenin 1960-68, 22:326).13 
In fall 1916, Lenin was forced to respond to yet another attack on 
Clause Nine, this time from left-wing Bolsheviks such as Nikolai Bukharin 
and Iu. Piatakov.  Again recalling the 1903 debates, Lenin called Piatakov’s 
position ‘imperialist economism.’  Once again, Kautsky was used to 
buttress Lenin’s contention that a democratic war for national self-
determination was still possible in the imperialist age: 
                                                 
12
 Lenin refers to Kautsky articles from 1895 and 1908. 
13
  Later in this article on national self-determination, Lenin refers to ‘the resolution of our 
Party in 1913 giving a precise ‘antikautskianskoe’ definition (that is, one that does not tolerate 
purely verbal ‘recognition’) of the content of the issue’ (Lenin 1958-64, 22:358).  This 
comment dramatically underscores the gulf between kautskianstvo (revolutionary words 
without revolutionary deeds) and Kautsky’s ideas, since, as we have seen, the 1913 resolution 
was defended by Lenin precisely by invoking Kautsky’s pronouncements on national self-
determination. 
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Up to the 1914-1916 war, Karl Kautsky was a Marxist, and many of his major 
writings and statements will always remain models of Marxism.  On August 26, 
1910, he wrote in Die Neue Zeit, in reference to the imminent war: ‘In war 
between Germany and England the issue is not democracy, but world 
domination, that is, exploitation of the world.  That is not an issue on which 
Social-Democrats can side with the exploiters of their nation.’ 
There you have an excellent Marxist formulation, one that fully coincides with 
our own and fully exposes the present-day Kautsky, who has turned from 
Marxism to defense of social-chauvinism.  It is a formulation (we shall have 
occasion to revert to it in other articles) that clearly brings out the principles 
underlying the Marxist attitude towards war.  War is the continuation of 
politics.  Hence, once there is a struggle for democracy, a war for democracy is 
possible.  National self-determination is but one of the democratic demands 
and does not, in principle, differ from other democratic demands (Lenin 1960-
68, 23:35). 
We have finished our brief survey of Lenin’s aggressive unoriginality 
in the years 1914-1916.  Lenin vehemently claims that his own definition 
of the current situation is based solidly on the prewar consensus of 
revolutionary Marxists, especially as expressed in the writings of Karl 
Kautsky.  The key themes in his political platform—the underlying idea of a 
revolutionary situation, the assertion that the world war had create a 
revolutionary situation, the obligations of the socialist parties to oppose 
the war and to work for revolution, the causes and consequences of their 
failure to meet these obligations—are all firmly anchored by him in this 
prewar consensus.  Attempts by Kautsky and others to move away from 
the consensus are met by Lenin with a firm rebuttal. 
Somewhat different expressions of aggressive unoriginality 
characterize both the revolutionary year 1917 and the first year and a half 
of power.  At the end of 1918, in his book-length polemic against ‘renegade 
Kautsky,’ Lenin uses this kind of rhetoric to describe his differences with 
Kautsky on the issues of bourgeois vs. proletarian democracy, international 
revolution, and peasant policy.  During 1919, Lenin began to realize that 
certain key Bolshevik assumptions were not panning out.  Among these 
were assumptions about international revolution, peasant policy, economic 
‘steps toward socialism,’ and proletarian democracy.  Of course, Lenin does 
not reject his earlier outlook.  Indeed, he makes as little cognitive 
adjustment as possible.  Nevertheless, he ruefully realizes that day-to-day 
policy can no longer be premised on the expectation of immediate 
LIH: Lenin’s Aggressive Unoriginality 
 
 
111 
revolution in Europe, of steady ‘steps toward socialism,’ and the like.   This 
period of Lenin’s activity might be called ‘reluctant originality.’14 
We will conclude by addressing the following paradox.  How is it that 
Lenin, standing almost alone and taking on the entire socialist 
establishment, emphasized his own unoriginality?  The answer to this 
natural query is that Lenin saw his task as the one shamefully forfeited by 
socialists such as Kautsky, namely, devising the new tactics called for by 
the long-predicted revolutionary situation.  
It is the ABC of Marxism that the tactics of the socialist proletariat cannot be 
the same both when there is a revolutionary situation and when there is no 
revolutionary situation… When Kautsky was still a Marxist, for example, in 
1909, when he wrote his Road to Power, it was the idea that war would 
inevitably lead to revolution that he advocated, and he spoke of the approach 
of an era of revolutions… But in 1918, when revolutions did begin in connection 
the war, Kautsky, instead of explaining that they were inevitable, instead of 
pondering over and thinking out the revolutionary tactics and the way and 
means of preparing for revolution, began to describe the reformist tactics of 
the Mensheviks as internationalism.  Isn’t this apostasy? (Lenin 1960-68, 
28:289, 283). 
This was Lenin’s self-appointed task: ‘pondering over and thinking out the 
revolutionary tactics and the way and means of preparing for revolution’ in 
the new yet long-predicted revolutionary situation— not just for Russia, 
but for Europe as a whole.  He had the strength of will (or foolhardiness, or 
conceit?) to move beyond his previous focus on Russia and assert a claim 
to European leadership because he felt that the leaders who should have 
worked out these new tactics had failed to do so.  He had the courage to 
take on the entire socialist establishment precisely because he felt that he, 
and not they, represented the prewar consensus of Marxist socialism. 
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14
 Lenin’s adjustments during this period will be described in more detail in my forthcoming 
biography of Lenin from Reaktion Books. 
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